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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BASIN F L Y I N G SERVICE, \ 
Protestant-Appellant, I 
vs. I 
P U B L I C SERVICE COMMISSION,!, Case No. 
D I N A L A N D A V I A T I O N / 13735 
I N C O R P O R A T E D and I 
F L A M I N G GORGE \ 
F L Y I N G SERVICE, I 
Respondents-Appellees. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
FACTS 
On or about October 18, 1973, Dinaland Aviation 
Incorporated (herein referred to as "Dinaland") 
filed its Application for a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity with the Public Service Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") in Case 
No. 6943, to operate as an aircraft carrier of passen-
gers and property in intrastate commerce, and in the 
additional information supplied with that Application 
asked in the form of allegation and prayer: 
I 
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"(3) That, in the alternative, Applicant claims 
that the charter service proposed by the Appli-
cant is not subject to regulation by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah and that said Com-
mission should so find." 
Prior to such filing the Commission had caused 
to be served on John A. Gardiner as President of 
Dinaland, and on Dinaland, a corporation, an Order 
to Show Cause in the Matter of the Investigation of 
Dinaland Aviation Incorporated and Flaming Gorge 
Flying Service for Performing Common Carrier Serv-
ice by Aircraft Without Authority From This Com-
mission (Investigation Docket No. 151). 
By Order of the Commission dated November 6, 
1973, the above entitled matters were consolidated on 
the same record, and a Hearing on the matters was 
held Thursday, December 13, 1973, in the Uintah 
County Building, Vernal, Utah. Basin Flying Service 
(herein referred to as "Basin") made its appear-
ance at such Hearing as a Protestant to Dinaland's 
Application. At that time, the matter of the Applica-
tion of Dinaland for a Certificate of Public Con-
venience and Necessity in Case No. 6943 was con-
tinued without date. 
A memorandum attacking the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission over non-scheduled airlines 
was served on Basin on the date of the hearing; Basin 
replied on January 9, 1974. 
By an Order dated April 25, 1974, and in spite of 
the amendment to the Public Utilities Act, Section 
2 
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54-1-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (which 
amendment was, in part, initiated by the Commission), 
the Commission took the position that it did not have 
jurisdiction over fixed-based operators such as Dina-
land, and, therefore, left the matter to be resolved by 
the ". . . Utah Supreme Court for a final determination 
of this issue." (Page 5, Order of April 25, 1974) 
A Petition for Rehearing was filed on May 15, 
1974 by Basin; said Petition was denied by an Order 
of the Commission dated May 30, 1974. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T 1 
D I N A L A N D IS A COMMON C A R R I E R A N D 
IS SUBJECT, T H E R E F O R E , TO T H E J U R I S -
D I C T I O N OF T H E P U B L I C SERVICE COM-
MISSION. 
The central issue in this matter is whether the 
Public Service Commission of Utah has the authority 
to compel a non-scheduled charter aircraft carrier to 
obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Neces-
sity to operate in intrastate traffic within the State 
of Utah. 
Section 54-2-1 (29), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
defines "aircraft carrier" as including: 
" . . . every corporation and person . . . operating 
for public service for hire engaged in intrastate 
transportation of persons or property; except 
those air carriers operating with a certificate of 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
convenience and necessity issued by the federal 
government." (emphasis added) 
The fact that "aircraft carrier" is not included, 
by its statutory definition, in the term "common carrier" 
(as that term is defined in Section 54-2-1(14), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953) does not exclude from it the 
effect of that statute. 
No inconsistency exists between this construction 
and the statutory mandate of Section 54-4-25 (1) 
which provides that: 
"No . . . aircraft carrier (corporation) . . . shall 
henceforth establish, or begin construction or 
operation of a . . . line, route, plant or system or 
of any extension of such . . . line, route, plant or 
system, without having first obtained from the 
commission a certificate that present or future 
public convenience and necessity does or will 
require such construction; . . . " 
The statute clearly expresses the legislative intent; 
that is to regulate "aircraft carriers" in the interest of 
public safety; advance the growth and welfare of the 
public in this area of activity yet protect the interests 
of present Certificate holders so far as can be done 
without injury to the public, either to its present wel-
fare or hindering its future growth, development and 
advancement. See Utah Light § Traction Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, et at, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683, 
690 (1941). 
Applicant Dinaland would have the Commission 
believe that it is ousted of jurisdiction to regulate and 
control activity such as it has performed or proposes to 
4 
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perform in intrastate traffic because it conducts a "non-
schedule" air carrier operation. In describing Dina-
land's service, Mr. Gardiner soared to spectacular 
heights of caprice and whimsy; that revealing bit of 
dialogue between Mr. Gardiner and Dinaland's coun-
sel appears on pages 15 and 16 of the transcript: 
Q. Sir, do you hold yourself out to the 
public to provide a transportation ser-
vice for any person who chooses to em-
ploy Dinaland Aviation, Inc. ? 
A. Not necessarily. W e feel that we have 
the right to turn down anyone at any 
time for various reasons. One would be 
because of weather. One would be be-
cause we might be having some main-
tenance done on a particular airplane, 
and if someone happens to call that we 
are not in good standing with, that want 
to go somewhere, we reserve the right 
to turn them down at any time. 
Q. So if somebody called you to provide a 
charter flight for him and you didn't 
like that individual for any reason what-
soever, such as the color of his eyes, in 
your judgment, could you turn him 
down? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would you do so? 
A. Yes. 
On more sober reflection, Mr. Gardiner's arbi-
trariness was tempered somewhat in a subsequent dia-
logue, as follows: 
5 
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Q. Mr. Gardner [sic], when you stated that 
you could turn anybody down for any 
reason, would that statement be quali-
fied by any Federal or State Law, as it 
pertains to civil rights or due to race, 
color, creed, et cetera? 
A. I think the Civil Rights Act, and as 
long as there is any Federal money ap-
propriated for an airport, you cannot 
discriminate against any persons, re-
gardless of race, color, or creed. 
Q. So when you said that, it would not be 
your intent to discriminate against 
people? 
A. The biggest share of the time, we turn 
down flights is because of bad weather, 
instrument conditions. W e have to re-
serve that right because we are not 
certified yet for instrument flying, the 
carrying of passengers and cargo. (Tr. 
p. 17) 
The "et cetera" in the question and Mr. Gardiner's 
response (involving race, color and creed) disposed, at 
least momentarily, of the ticklish problem of eye color. 
Yet, Dinaland persists in attributing ultra special 
meanings to flight terms such as "non-scheduled," 
"irregular routes" and "irregular times." On one hand 
the operation is unscheduled and irregular—to the 
point of appearing, downright haphazard; the operator 
would give precedence to a wife's shopping trip over a 
call for a business flight (Tr. p. 18). But then, in 
describing the type of service Dinaland holds itself out 
6 
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to perform, Mr. Gardiner details a 60 by 80 foot metal 
hanger, heated, with office facility, pilots' lounge and a 
fuel service; student instruction; charter air taxi ser-
vice (Tr. p. 15). He expansively notes that it holds a 
license from the State Aeronautics Division, State of 
Utah, and a "Federal F A A license which covers us for 
the carrying of passengers, cargo freight, to any point 
in the Continental United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
That is single and multi-engine." (Tr. p. 16) 
In describing its operation Dinaland is depicting 
precisely the type of activity the legislature felt should 
be controlled and regulated by the Commission; Dina-
land put itself squarely within the meaning of "common 
carrier" in spite of what it maintains is the exclusionary 
effect of "scheduled" as that word is used in Section 
54-2-1 (14), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
A "common carrier" has been defined as one who 
holds himself out to the public as engaged in the busi-
ness of transporting persons or property from place 
to place, for compensation, offering its services to the 
public generally. Travis v. Dickey, 96 Okla. 250, 222 
P . 527 (1924) citing R.C.L.; United States v. Ramsey, 
197 F . 144 (8th Cir. 1912), 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1031. 
We submit that the admission by Dinaland that there 
could be no discrimination, in terms of service, for rea-
sons of "race, color, or creed" opens the service (not-
withstanding color of eyes and a spouse's shopping 
trip) "to the public generally." Dinaland consistently 
describes the service it provides as being "on call" (Tr. 
p. 15). The Courts have held that a common carrier 
7 
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by air need not have a regular schedule of flights 
(Alaska Air Transport Inc. v. Alaska Airplane Chart-
er Co., 72 F . Supp. 609 D. C. Alaska, 1947); or a 
fixed route (Cushing v. White, 101 Wash. 172, 172 
P . 229, 1918); or a relatively unlimited carrying 
capacity. A carrier may limit its operations solely to 
charter flights and still be a common carrier (Alaska 
Air Transport Inc., v. Alaska Airplane Charter Co., 
supra). 
I t is not the self serving label adopted by Dina-
land that is determinative; it is not what Dinaland de-
clares itself to be but rather what the circumstances 
show it to be. The crucial test as to "whether one is a 
common carrier is whether he holds himself out as such, 
expressly or by a course of conduct, that he will carry 
for hire on a uniform tariff all persons applying . . . 
so long as he has room" Fixel: Aviation, 3rd Ed. 
(1948) Sec. 372, p. 261. 
Dinaland has by its activities and description of 
its operations held itself out to be a common carrier. 
As such it must be so treated for the safety and wel-
fare of the community; it must be subject to the regu-
latory control of this Commission as that control was 
authorized and directed by the legislature. 
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the under-
lying policy of public utility regulation. One of the 
most recent reassertions of this policy was expressed in 
Cottonwood Mall Shop. Ctr., Inc. v. Utah Power and 
Light Co., 440 F.2d 36, 40 (10th Cir. 1971), cert, 
denied, 404 U.S. 857, 30 L.Ed.2d 99, 92 S.Ct. 107, 
wherein the Court stated: 
$ 
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"The analysis begins with the long-ago, but still 
pertinent, declaration of the Utah Supreme 
Court on the underlying policy of public utility 
regulation. In Crilmer v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 1926, 67 Utah 222, 247 P . 284, that 
Court pointed out that though competition was 
usually a desirable goal, the states had found the 
case to be otherwise in the public utility field. 
The states felt it more suitable to put these activi-
ties under closely controlled, state granted mono-
polies. This means that in construing these sta-
tues—which of course expressly cover the phy-
sical operational activities of Cottonwood—we 
must give a liberal reading to provisions sub-
jecting the activity to regulation while simul-
taneously giving a more narrow scope to the ex-
ceptions!' (emphasis added) 
Basin submits that the statute cloaks the Commis-
sion with the requisite authority to regulate aircraft 
carriers—whether scheduled or non-scheduled—as long 
as such carrier is operating for public service, for hire 
and is engaged in intrastate transportation of persons 
or property. Considerations of public policy and welfare 
tip the scales in favor of regulation and against the 
exceptions claimed by Dinaland. To do otherwise would 
defeat the legislative purpose of the 1969 amendments 
to Sections 54-2-1 and 54-4-25, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
P O I N T I I 
D I N A L A N D IS A N A I R C R A F T C A R R I E R 
W I T H I N T H E C O N T E M P L A T I O N OF SEC-
9 
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TION 54-2-1 (29) A N D IS S U B J E C T TO R E G U -
L A T I O N BY T H E P U B L I C S E R V I C E COM-
MISSION. 
Dinaland has taken the position that it is not a 
common carrier as that term is defined in Section 54-2-1 
(14), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This is based on the 
inclusion of the word "scheduled" prior to the words 
"aircraft carrier" in the definition of "common carrier." 
The word "scheduled" however, is not found in the 
regulatory part of the statute, Section 54-4-25 (1), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides: 
"54-4-25. C E R T I F I C A T E OF CONVENI-
E N C E A N D N E C E S S I T Y P R E R E Q U I -
S I T E TO CONSTRUCTION AND OPER-
A T I O N — C E R T I F I C A T E S ISSUED TO 
E L E C T R I C A L C O R P O R A T I O N S 
B R O U G H T U N D E R ACT—AIR CAR-
R I E R S . — (1) No railroad corporation, street 
railroad corporation, aerial bucket tramway cor-
poration, gas corporation, electrical corporation, 
telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, 
heat corporation, automobile corporation, air-
craft carrier (corporation), . . . shall henceforth 
establish, or begin construction or operation of a 
railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, 
line, route, plant or system or of any extension of 
such railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tram-
way, , , , without having first obtained from the 
commission a certificate . . . " (emphasis added) 
Dinaland would have us ignore the plain meaning 
of the above Section and insert "scheduled" before 
"aircraft carrier" in order ". . . to bring Section 54-4-25 
10 
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(1) . . . into conformity with the entire statutory 
scheme." (Page 5 of Reply of Dinaland to the Mem-
orandum of Basin, February 13, 1974) On the contrary, 
"scheduled" should be removed from the definition set 
forth in Section 54-2-1 (14) in order to correct the sta-
tutory scheme. 
If we were to assume that Dinaland would not 
qualify as a common carrier under Utah law, (although 
we do not so admit), the effect of Section 54-2-1 (14) 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is inescapable; it does not 
require that one be a common carrier in order to come 
under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commis-
sion. As Section 54-2-1 (29), Utah Code Annotated 
provides: 
"(29) The term 'aircraft carrier' includes every 
corporation and person, and lessee, trustee and 
receivers or trustees appointed by any court 
whatsoever, operating for public service for hire 
engaged in intrastate transportation of persons 
or property; except those air carriers operating 
with a certificate of convenience and necessity 
issued by the federal government." (emphasis 
added) 
Dinaland is clearly an "aircraft carrier" in the 
public service. While it is true one cannot be a "common 
carrier" by definition without being in the public service, 
the converse is not true; an individual or corporation 
can be in the public service without meeting all of the 
requirements or possessing the characteristics of a 
common carrier; and one who is an "aircraft carrier" 
11 
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is subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Com-
mission. 
Dinaland would remove jurisdiction from the Pub-
lic Service Commission merely because one of the four 
statutory refrences to the term "aircraft carrier" in-
cluded the modifier, "scheduled." [Section 54-2-1 (14) ] 
None of the remaining three [Sections 54-2-1 (29), 
54-4-25 (1) and 54-4-25 (6)] includes this term which 
seemingly was added as an afterthougrt in longhand by 
an unknown party. 
The House Journal of 1969 provides little illumin-
ation on the history of H.B. 244, the Bill which amended 
the statutes in question. There is, however, a most ac-
curate appraisal of what the legislators intended this 
legislation to accomplish as expressed in the formal 
name of H.B. 244 which reads: 
"AN ACT A M E N D I N G SECTION 54-2-1, 
U.C.A., 1933, AS A M E N D E D BY C H A P -
T E R 106, L A W S O F U T A H 1957, A N D 
C H A P T E R 94, L A W S O F U T A H 1959, 
A N D C H A P T E R 106, L A W S O F U T A H 
1965, AND 54-4-25, U.C.A. 1953, AS A M E N -
D E D B Y C H A P T E R 106, L A W S O F 
U T A H 1957, A N D C H A P T E R 106, L A W S 
OF U T A H 1965, R E L A T I N G TO T H E 
P U B L I C S E R V I C E COMMISSION; 
P R O V I D I N G F O R D E F I N I N G AIR-
C R A F T CARRIERS AS P U B L I C U T I L I -
T I E S A N D B R I N G I N G A I R C R A F T 
O P E R A T E D F O R H I R E U N D E R T H E 
J U R I S D I C T I O N A N D R E G U L A T I O N 
O F T H E P U B L I C S E R V I C E COMMIS-
12 
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SION; R E Q U I R I N G T H A T A I R C R A F T 
C A R R I E R S OBTAIN A C E R T I F I C A T E 
OF CONVENIENCE A N D N E C E S S I T Y 
B E F O R E B E G I N N I N G N E W OR A D D I -
T I O N A L SERVICES; A N D A L L O W I N G 
A I R C R A F T C A R R I E R S TO C O N T I N U E 
P R E S E N T SERVICES U N D E R CER-
TAIN CONDITIONS." p. 380, HOUSE 
J O U R N A L 1969 
Nowhere does the word "scheduled" appear in the title. 
The courts are quite uniform in holding that the 
title of an act is to be considered in construing it. Cline 
v. Knight 111 Colo. 8, 137 P.2d 680, 146 A.L.R. 1281 
(1943). The rule is well established that, in the case of 
ambiguity, the title may be resorted to as an aid to the 
ascertainment of the legislative intent. 82 C.J.S. Sec. 
350, p. 731, and cases cited. 
It is Basin's position that the legislators had a firm 
comprehension of the type and nature of the service to 
be regulated, i.e., precisely the service defined in the 
title. To consider the effect and purpose of the Act in 
any other light would be to ask this court to indulge in 
judicial legislation, and with nothing more than the 
appearance of one word in one statutory section as a 
guide, edit the entire balance of the statute to buttress 
the Commission's position in abdicating jurisdiction. 
Basin is not alone in this State; it is one of many 
fight operations which is non-scheduled and which has 
submitted to and remained subject to the regulation 
and control of the Commission in compliance with the 
13 
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provisions of the above cited statutes. In return for sub-
mission to such regulatory authority, including stringent 
safety standards and financial support to the commis-
sion in the form of tariffs and taxes, Basin and its fellow 
flying services enjoy the privilege of operating without 
the threat of cut-throat competitors. Now, the Commis-
sion would abdicate its regulatory power, thus divesting 
Basin and other operators of the protection and regula-
tion they have accepted and functioned under since the 
effective date of said statute. I t takes no imagination 
to picture the loss to the public; for who would be 
willing to make a substantial financial investment in a 
remote operation such as Blanding, Utah, unless he can 
be certain that his investment will be protected from 
barnstorming competition. Not only will the public be 
denied flying services in the outlying areas, but in those 
areas where services do exist, there will be no guarantee 
of the high safety standards heretofore imposed by the 
Public Service Commission. Here is laissez fiare with 
all of the dangers, inequities and waste that could result 
from Commission non-interference and indifference. 
In its Reply Memorandum of February 13, 1974, 
Dinaland quoted from Williams v. Public Service Com-
mission, 21 U.2d 155 (1968), wherein Justice Henriod 
properly stated that no legislative basis existed for the 
problem then before the Court. The Court pointed out 
that: 
"The Legislature shortly will meet. That is the 
foundation of administrative authority, and we 
leave it to that body under our tripartite system 
14 
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to clarify any obfuscation that seems to exist in 
the minds of some interested parties. With a few 
words, the Legislature, with appropriate imple-
menting language, surely could make freight cars 
and boats, highways and waterways analogous if 
it intends such a conclusion." 21 U.2d 157 
The case at bar is different; the legislature has 
already met with the specific purpose of placing fixed-
based operators under the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, and the amendments of 1969 clearly place Dina-
land, Basin and others like them under the regulation 
of the Public Service Commission. 
For the reasons set forth above, Basin respectfully 
requests the Court to reverse the April 25, 1974 Order 
of the Commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Hugh C. Garner and 
Alan A. Enke of 
RAY, Q U I N N E Y & N E B E K E R 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1500 
Attorneys for 
BASIN F L Y I N G SERVICE 
Protestant-Appellant 
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